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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates regulation by contract in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in 
infrastructure services. Although the benefits of competition for the market and of regulatory 
contracts are widely acknowledged, the literature indentifies several failures in their design. 
These ‘flaws’ are present in both developed and developing countries and arise in all types of 
contracts. This study analyses both short and long term contracts, focusing on purely contractual 
PPPs and institutionalized PPPs (mixed companies). The evidence suggests that for all kinds of 
contracts, the major problems tend to arise in the preparation of public tender documents: the 
‘best’ bidder is not often the winner. The likely results include redistribution in favor of the 
private partner, weak incentives for high performance, and renegotiation of contracts.  
Moreover, risks are not allocated correctly nor is effective monitoring ensured. This review of 
contract procedures and design allows us to draw several implications for policy-makers and to 
present suggestions and recommendations for improving regulatory contracts. 
 
Keywords: regulation by contract; bidding documents; contract design; risk; monitoring  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Most infrastructure services are characterized by their (natural) monopolistic features, 
so, in theory, a single operator would maximize productive efficiency. However, actual 
experience suggests that prices are set above marginal and average costs, reducing 
economic welfare and often causing excessive profits and significant allocative 
inefficiency. From another point of view, the monopolistic operator often does not focus 
on cost reduction, as it is prone to the ‘quiet life’ and associated X-inefficiency. 
Implementing external regulation by an independent agency attempts to solve these 
monopoly problems, inducing optimal (or at least second best) prices and quantities, 
improving social welfare.  
 
Of course, external regulation also has diverse shortcomings, including problems with 
asymmetric information, short-run cost containment, possibility of regulatory capture, 
long-run investment incentives, and regulatory opportunism. These circumstances have 
caused economists to seek alternative approaches for addressing (natural) monopoly 
problems. One approach replaces the external regulator with regulation by contract 
where there is competition for the ‘franchise’ (access to the market). This framework, 
                                                 
1 This article was written when the first author was a Visiting Scholar in the Public Utility Research 
Center (PURC) at the University of Florida. The author gratefully acknowledges his sabbatical 
scholarship granted by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. The first author is an 
Assistant Professor of Systems and Management (IST) at the Technical University of Lisbon. The co-
author is a Distinguished Service Professor in Economics at the University of Florida (and PURC 
Director of Water Studies). 
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 utilizes public-private partnerships (henceforth PPPs).2, 3 The European Union, without 
a formal definition of PPP, refers to it as types of cooperation between public authorities 
and the world of businesses aimed at ensuring the funding, construction, renewal, 
management and/or maintenance of infrastructure, or the provision of a related service. 
In a broader sense, regulation by contract integrates the setting of duties and rights of a 
private firm and a public partner, establishing the incentives and responsibilities under 
which they would operate, including the risk sharing and risk allocation (Klein, 1998). 
 
The idea of PPP contracts has a long history. In the 19th century in England, Sir Edwin 
Chadwick suggested a solution for the natural monopoly problem based on franchising 
(Chadwick, 1859). He distinguished between competition within the field and 
competition for the field. The latter was to take place when the former was not possible. 
The implication of this theory was that the right to operate a monopoly could be subject 
to an auction. The auction winner would be the bidder to present the best offer (lower 
price to customers or higher rent to the awarding agency). The competition which was 
promoted would place prices of products and services close to average costs if this was 
the only award criteria considered. These principles, utilized prior to the beginning of 
the 20th century in Europe and the US for the provision of infrastructure services 
(energy, water and fixed telecoms), were re-visited and extended by Harold Demsetz. 
This author went farther than Chadwick by criticizing what had become cost of service 
regulation in the US Arguing that welfare was not maximized under arrangements 
utilized at that time, he identified the franchising option as the preferred approach 
(Demsetz, 1968).  
 
According to Demsetz, potential competition for the market would lead to greater 
production and allocative (pricing) efficiency, since those bidding for monopolistic 
operations would feel threatened by the prices proposed by other potential competitors.4 
Thus, they would set prices close to average costs, which would cover the costs entirely 
and allow for a reasonable and fair return on capital. Demsetz (1968, p. 61), like 
Chadwick, argued that the Government should auction the right to provide 
infrastructure services, believing that rivalry of the open marketplace (the invisible 
hand) disciplines more effectively than the regulatory processes of the government 
agencies (the visible clenched fist).   
 
The bidding should be open with several bids and the price should be the award criteria. 
The bidder with the best offer (lower price or higher rent) would win the auction, 
                                                 
2 The concept of public-private partnership (PPP) adopted here corresponds to one used in the European 
Union, which includes institutionalized PPP (mixed companies) and purely contractual PPPs. The latter 
comprises concession, affermage, or management contracts. Concession contracts are, in its turn, divided 
into public work or public service concessions depending on whether the turnover of the private sector is 
predominantly originated in public works or in the operation of a service. The Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and other similar contracts (e.g. DBOOT) are included 
in the first group. However, outright divesture (full privatization) is not a PPP. Economically speaking, 
the term franchising is often utilized. This paper uses the terms franchising and PPP interchangeably.      
3 It should be stressed that a public tender is not always required. Contractual regulation can be 
implemented with a wholly publicly-owned management entity (incorporated or not) as well. Frequently 
this occurs when the partners are public but belong to different levels of government (local and regional), 
called, in this case, public-public partnerships. In this review, we always assume a private partner and the 
existence of a public tender to award the project.  
4 As Dnes notes (1991, p.214) ‘Demsetz is a forerunner of later contestability analysis’. 
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 guaranteeing that in a situation of sufficient competition (and no collusive behavior) 
that the winner would offer an average price close to the average cost, allowing for fair 
profits.5 The role of the Government would change from being the regulator to the one 
responsible for the bidding process that is, making and managing the rules so that the 
competition for access to the market can take place in an adequate way.6 Later articles 
criticized the Demsetz analysis as being too simplistic, since quality of service, network 
expansion and upgrade, and other issues were not fully addressed. These points are 
developed shortly.   
 
In the 80’s and the 90’s, neoliberalism and the funding requirements of capital projects 
for essential infrastructures drove a number of countries to privatize their infrastructure 
industries. In some sectors, like energy and telecommunications, full divesture was the 
main option, but in the water sector (water and wastewater utilities) and in 
transportation (roads, railways, airports and ports) the use of PPPs (particularly 
concession contracts) was preferred. This happened for different reasons, but the most 
important is related to the responsibility for these services, which in the latter case often 
belongs to the municipalities, generally are close to customers, and reflect the public 
nature of the services. Although the impact of private sector participation in 
infrastructure industries is mostly positive, there are mixed results in some countries and 
even with seemingly successful outcomes, the results are not transparent:  the results 
could be different.  Estache (2006) stresses that in developing countries, much of what 
is going on is not known: “many of the fights and ‘peace treaties’ made by the 
‘partners’ are not shared with the outsiders.”7  
 
In the water and transportation sectors, some contracts had early termination and many 
others were renegotiated. Guasch (2004) found that for Latin America (with a sample of 
1,000 contracts) 75% of the water concession contracts were renegotiated after an 
average of 1,6 years after their signature. The numbers are better for the transportation 
sector (55% and 3.1 years) but still suggest significant flaws in initial arrangements.8 
Besides the breakdown and the early termination of the contracts, renegotiation 
represents another major disappointing outcome for concession contracts. Under 
renegotiation, there is bilateral bargaining to restore a mutually acceptable situation for 
the parties; however, without competitive options, the operator will always have more 
information on the implications of alternative contractual arrangements.  Thus, service 
providers tend to be in a position to impose their requirements.9 Such changes in the 
rules of the game undermine the legitimacy of the original contract award.  
 
                                                 
5 As Demsetz states (1968, p.57) ‘if the number of bidders is large or if, for other reasons, collusion 
among them is impractical, the contracted price can be very close to per-unit production cost’. 
6 In recognition of the contribution of Edwin Chadwick and Harold Demsetz, competition in franchise 
bidding, whose single factor in awarding is the price, became known as Chadwick-Demsetz auctions.  
7 Estache (2006) argues that the different interpretations of the success or failure of PPPs in developing 
countries is due to the “differences in the assessment criteria used to assess the incremental effect of 
reforms. ” (p. 3)  The present paper does not address the distributional impact of PPPs, corruption, 
macroeconomic shocks, and other issues he explores, but focuses on risk allocation and contract design. 
8 According to past research, a higher incidence of renegotiation occurs under competitive bidding, price 
cap regulation, the non-existence of a regulatory body, compulsory investments, and when award criteria 
are based on the lowest tariff and the legal framework is embedded only in the contract (Guasch, 2004).  
9 As Bajari et al. (2005) shows empirically, renegotiation unavoidability leads to extra costs for users.  
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 The two major causes for the failures of PPPs are contractual incompleteness and 
imperfect allocation of risks. These two problems result from (what tends to be) a very 
simplistic bidding process, inadequate specification of the terms and conditions for the 
operator, incompetent oversight, and (in some cases) opportunistic behavior by 
powerful international corporations. This set of factors lead to dubious award granting 
processes, incomplete contract designs and unfair (and inefficient) risk allocation. The 
purpose of this study is to examine these issues and this kind of ‘regulation without 
regulator’. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the benefits and 
shortcomings of regulation by contract. Section 3 analyses the different kinds of 
contract depending on their possible extension and the possibility of ex-post 
opportunism. In addition, the study evaluates their application in infrastructure services. 
Section 4 examines the major failures of regulatory contracts. Section 5 analyzes briefly 
the different ways of private sector participation and consequently their contractual 
arrangements. Concluding observations are presented in section 6.     
 
 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF REGULATION BY CONTRACT  
 
2.1 Strengths of Regulation by Contract 
 
The defenders of PPPs and “regulation by contract” emphasize several advantages of 
this option (see, for example, Demsetz, 1968, Stigler, 1968 and Posner, 1972). These 
advantages can be divided into those relative to the option of full divesture and relative 
to the alternative of public provision. Compared with the divesture/privatization option, 
one of the benefits of regulation by contract is that the Government does not need very 
detailed information about costs, demand and other features of the projects, nor is a 
“traditional” regulatory agency or a contractual management agency required, leading to 
lower cost compared with external regulation and its associated bureaucratic procedures 
and reporting requirements (Viscusi, et al., 1995). Another benefit is that concession 
and other PPP contracts do not foster over-investment compared with some regulatory 
methods (e.g. Averch-Johnson overcapitalization under rate of return regulation). Since 
the PPP-holder captures all the gains associated with efficiency improvements and new 
service introductions, it has strong incentives to be innovative.10 From this perspective, 
competition for the market yields very positive results as well, eliminating a substantial 
part of the monopoly rents. Other advantages are related to the operator’s concern with 
its reputation: recognizing potential cash flows for future periods (and for other 
franchise areas) constrains the potential operator hold-up behavior. In theory, the 
operator has an interest in delivering mutually beneficial outcomes via its current 
operations if it intends to remain in the market after the contract expires (or to avoid 
early termination) and plans to expand its activities by winning other bids.  
 
PPPs have other advantages, related to price signals and investment. Crew and Zupan, 
(1990) provide some theoretical explanations for reduced cross-subsidization. Indeed, in 
the contract arrangement, the bidders have an added predisposition to establish prices 
oriented to the true costs (the prices are closer to the average cost of each product and 
service). Analysts are familiar with traditional concerns over public provision. These 
                                                 
10 Under some scenarios, a PPP fosters the same incentives as a pure price cap method (Crew and Zupan, 
1990). 
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 emerge from public choice theory and include the agency problem, the lack of 
shareholder pressure (and reduced incentives for cost-containment), and lack of 
competitive pressures for quality improvements. The PPP option has other advantages 
associated with project financing, and the on-time and on-budget delivery when 
investors face penalties for construction delays and cost over-runs (Murphy, 2008 and 
Vining and Boardman, 2008). The private partner is interested in the timing of cash-
flows: minimizing or delaying outlays and accelerating inflows. Allocating appropriate 
risks to private investors (and managers) in the PPP leads to the development of risk 
mitigation strategies, cost savings, and service quality improvements.  
 
In particular, the private sector is in a position to mitigate risks associated with 
construction and operations: such savings can reduce the NPV of project costs even in 
the presence of a higher risk premium (higher cost of capital). The cost savings occur 
over the entire project cycle, allowing for optimizing behavior throughout the stages of 
the project (design, construction, operation, and closure/clean-up). In general, PPPs 
enhance the quality of service since providers are accountable to both customers and to 
government partners. In addition, customers tend to be more demanding when the 
provider of the infrastructure services is private (Marques and Levy, 2006).  When a 
private operator profits from the provision of an essential service, customers have 
higher expectations than in a situation of public (in-house) provision.      
 
 
2.2 Limitations of Regulation by Contract 
 
The drawbacks of regulation by contract have been identified by the opponents of PPPs 
and supporters of both full divesture and of public ownership. Williamson (1976) and 
Goldberg (1976)11 argue that information requirements are high as well. Moreover, the 
supervising entity responsible for contract management is basically a regulator. Thus, 
the cost of regulation by contract is also significant: over-investment can continue to be 
relevant (via the imposition of minimum investments) and the provision of incentives to 
efficiency and innovation is dubious (when renegotiation and ex-post opportunism, 
including clawbacks, play a role).12 An example of the bid preparation cost is the 
concession of water services in Buenos Aires in Argentina: Government bid preparation 
and evaluation cost about $ 4 million (US) for and it cost each bidder about $ 5 million 
(US) to prepare the bid. In addition, the bidding stage took about two years (Jouravlev, 
2000, p.20). Another shortcoming is the price which is only a ‘second best’ (when 
average and not marginal prices are used). However, in theory, efficient price signals 
can be achieved if a two-part tariff is adopted.13  
 
Another issue associated with regulation by contract is the principal’s behavior at 
various stages of access to the market: the bidding stage (since the decision to call for a 
                                                 
11 In 1907, the major problems of contractual regulation and competition for the market had already been 
pointed out [(Fisher, 1907), op. cit. at Williamson,  1976)].  
12 One can argue that whereas ‘many of the problems associated with regulation lie in what is being 
regulated, not in the act of regulation itself’ (Goldberg, 1976, p.246), the major problems of contractual 
regulation are almost always related to the quality of contract design.  
13 If Government has sufficient information about demand, two-part price setting can be efficient (Willig, 
1978). Of course, the distribution of demand and consumer surplus extracted from low-income demanders 
(via a monthly fee) raises issues of fairness.   
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 tender is essentially political in nature), the preparation of the documents for the bidding 
process, the evaluation stage, the actual award decision and announcement, the design 
of the contract terms, and the appeal and eventual lawsuit. The complexity of the award 
process is particularly relevant when there is more than one criterion, mainly when 
technical and quality criteria are included, often resulting in the evaluation team having 
some discretion (Williamson, 1976). Even if there is a single criterion, transparency and 
objectivity cannot be guaranteed. For example, in transportation, the use of non-
standardized (traffic) demand or in the water sector the lack of consumption pattern 
information (related to assumptions about the population and consumption per 
customer) can lead to a excessive optimism or even the winner’s curse.14  
 
Collusive behavior is another possible problem. Sometimes, there are few bidding 
companies, especially when the PPP contracts are divided by region. Alternatively, 
local reputation and regional economies of scale could cause such focused bidding 
(Boardman and Vining, 2008). Concerning contract monitoring, supervising quality of 
service requires expertise and careful auditing procedures for company-provided data. 
Since infrastructure services are often heterogeneous, their value depends on the 
customers with a willingness to pay according to the quality provided. Therefore, 
performance evaluation could go beyond price considerations to include the pattern of 
service quality provided. Quality conditions must be imposed in the bidding 
requirements. The government, as contracting agent, can adopt two different ways to 
incorporate service quality: (1) set minimum quality requirements for the bid, and (2) 
include the quality of service as an award criterion (adding complexity and potential 
discretion to the award procedure). Both methodologies require information about 
customer valuations of service quality and present difficulties in monitoring 
performance during the contract. The supervision of quality of service requires some 
agency to track outcomes, which reintroduces a regulator through the back door.  
Furthermore, governments frequently engage in rent seeking activity, which can run 
counter to social welfare. Side-payments or political contributions can influence initially 
the selection and renegotiation. In addition to the associated corruption, which is not 
examined here, cash-flows from PPPs can be used to subsidize other projects, 
endangering their viability.15  
 
Opposition to private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure services also 
reflects public perceptions regarding a number of potential impacts: 
 
1.  Higher costs resulting from the search for profits;  
2.  Higher cost of project finance;  
3.  Potentially higher procurement costs (in the absence of stringent ring fencing);  
4.  Lower customer satisfaction (due to reduced service quality for items not stated 
in the contract);  
5.  Underinvestment in maintaining infrastructure which may lead to long term 
dilapidation of the network (Johnson, 1989);  
                                                 
14 Of course, low-balling (underpricing) can be carried out deliberality in the hope of achieving more 
favorable terms at the contract renegotiation stage.  
15 For more about corruption in public contracting see Boehm and Olays (2006). These authors present 
hypotheses regarding corruption at three stages: 1) before bidding (the preparatory phase); 2) bidding and 
award; and 3) the aftermath (after the award). 
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 6.  Threats to workers’ rights;  
7.  Loss of public policy flexibility with a long term contract;  
8.  Less transparency and the accountability of the providers.  
With exception of the first arguments regarding the costs (that are balanced by the 
reduction of costs in other items), all the other issues can be covered in the contract 
design. For example, concern over the rights of workers is not applicable, as most of the 
PPP workers are protected by law in each country. Normally, conditions for high 
performing workers are improved with the entrance of the private sector (e.g. new 
benefits, safety programs, capacity building initiatives, and rewards for high 
performance). Concerning accountability, although the private sector can be designated 
to provide infrastructure services, the responsibility for monitoring performance 
remains with the public sector.16             
 
 
3. CONTRACT DESIGN ISSUES 
 
3.1 Classification of Contracts   
 
Designing PPP contracts to be signed between the Government and the private operator 
requires that several problems are addressed. The main issue is balancing the initial 
preparation costs (affecting the incompleteness of the contract) against the transaction 
costs generated by probable renegotiation. First, the contents of the contract must reflect 
the winning bid. The authors of this study argue that the template for the contract 
(including fixed and open clauses) should be provided as an annex in the tender 
documents. Only in this way can transparency and fairness be guaranteed. However, 
there are some clauses which require some bargaining with the winning bidder before 
the signing of the contract. To begin with, the activities of the (current) public operator 
do not stop at the moment of the tender call notice, so conditions may have changed, 
including alterations in the construction of some infrastructure; such changes can affect 
the business case. Likewise, some points are normally negotiated in this phase, 
including the final terms of the economic and financial arrangements, the timing of 
investments, specific penalties for noncompliance by both parties, implementation of 
procedures (including appeals), service quality levels, and conditions for early 
termination of the contract.  
 
Moreover, the future is always uncertain: asset transfer between contracts can introduce 
controversy into the process (Posner, 1972). If prices, production technology, and 
demand are known in advance or do not change over time, the cash flows will be 
predictable.  Similarly, if the contract only encompasses operation and maintenance and 
does not include the investment in sunk and long-lived assets, the relationship between 
the government and the private firm presents few contractual issues. Such contracts can 
be classified into two groups: (1) short-run with systematic biddings (rebidding) 
between one and five years, possibly up to 10 years, and (2) incomplete  and long-run 
contracts with a length greater than twelve years (Klein, 1998). The literature diverges 
                                                 
16 Some authors consider a perceived lack of accountability an advantage since private firms can set 
prices that reflect the true cost of service (Vining and Boardman, 2008). Although this point of view is 
understandable, the public sector cannot dismiss its own responsibility. As Hart (2003) notes, ‘the owner 
has ‘residual control rights’.  
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 between the defenders of one and other kind. Stigler (1968) advocated a third approach 
of contracts, the so-called ‘once-for-all contracts’ which, realistically are not viable in 
most infrastructure services. The strengths and limitations of different types of contracts 
are discussed and analyzed next.17    
 
 
3.2 Rebidding and Short-Run Contracts 
 
Short-run contracts present two major advantages. First, the detail and the specification 
about costs and demand, as well as the possible flaws in arrangements are not 
excessively problematic since the contracts are periodically reviewed in the new public 
bidding. Thus, deviations from mutually beneficial arrangements are not significant. 
Second, these contracts do not need to focus on quality of service supervision due to the 
short time frame. If the operator causes trouble or provides poor service quality a new 
contract or extension can be rejected. Thus, the operators, a priori, are not ‘fly-by-night 
service providers’: they intend to continue to operate in the market and will take care to 
fulfill the contract, maintain good relationships with customers, and strengthen their 
reputation.   
 
On the other hand, short-run contracts may exhibit shortcoming related to the renewal 
of the contract.  These problems are based on the lack of parity among bidders, 
reflecting information asymmetries. The incumbent will generally have made 
investments in infrastructures in the service territory and will have a deep understanding 
of demand patterns and local geography. Although assets can be transferred to a new 
entrant, this process is not simple.  The initial operator was presumably maximizing 
profits, so book value (after depreciation) may not correspond to the economic value of 
assets, especially when maintenance of underground networks is difficult to verify 
(Williamson, 1976). The workers who have technological know-how of operations are 
not necessarily easy to transfer. Such shifts in operators are likely to involve higher 
salaries (although if the local market for such specialized skills is thin, this may not be 
such a problem).   
 
Another advantage for the incumbent is the inertia of politicians and bureaucratic 
decision makers, who are likely to be unenthusiastic about starting a new contractual 
relationship. Potential changes in working methods and routines tend to reduce the 
likelihood of switching providers when the selection gives decision-makers discretion 
(Viscusi et al., 1995, p.426). Thus, the incumbent’s knowledge of about future demand, 
organizational capabilities, and the true cost of production give it an advantage over 
other bidders. In a careful study of more than 3,000 decisions on renewal of cable TV 
contracts in the US, only sixty of them involved replacing the incumbent.  However, the 
authors could not determine whether the stability was related to the lack of competition 
or to satisfaction with incumbent performance (Zupan, 1989 a, b). Finally, short-run 
contracts are viewed as hindering efficiency and innovation, since there is no guarantee 
if investors can take advantage of savings from capital outlays on long-lived assets.  
 
 
                                                 
17 The contractual issues are analyzed in detail in two seminal articles that advocate and criticize the 
regulation by contract, respectively. See Posner (1972) and Williamson (1976).   
 8
 3.3 Incompleteness and Long-Run Contracts 
 
Long term contracts are labeled as incomplete since they are unable to specify 
responsibilities under all possible contingencies. Responsibilities tend to be negotiated 
over the time through rules and understandings that emerged in response to similar 
events in the past. The main advantage of this kind of contract is its appropriateness 
when it is necessary to make large investments in long-lived (sunk) infrastructure 
networks, where the payback period is relatively long. The drawbacks that are usually 
highlighted include (a) higher risks associated with these contracts, (b) difficulty of 
designing terms and conditions that are mutually beneficial, (c) greater transaction costs 
than short term contracts, (d) the need to predict the maximum change for automatic 
mechanisms related to the consumer price index (annual review of tariffs), and (e) the 
inclusion of rewards and penalties according to overall performance and the fulfillment 
of specific contract clauses.18 
 
 
3.4 Opportunism Ex Post19 
 
Opportunistic behavior ex post can be exhibited by the winning bidder (private partner) 
or the awarding entity (public partner). On the one hand, the private firm might want to 
renegotiate the contract, based on the clauses agreed upon ex ante, arguing that the 
demand is lower and the costs are higher than predicted and that there are exogenous 
factors which change the contractual conditions defined ex ante. This process of 
renegotiation is long and complex and enables deviations from the original contract, so 
objectives of the project may not be achieved. The choice of the PPP-holder is made by 
public tender (competitive environment) and the renegotiation is a bilateral bargain. 
Thus, there are substantial information (and resource) asymmetries (see Guasch, 
2004).20  
 
One strategy of players in public biddings is “low balling”: submitting a bid with an 
exceptional quality and very low prices, perhaps not even covering reasonable average 
cost. Such underbidding intentionally involves the (optimistic) winner’s curse: the 
winner then is betting that renegotiation will result in a profitable outcome (Dnes, 
1995). Thus, the operator has a margin for bargaining, assuming that some kind of 
investment has already been made. The threat of interruption in the provision of a 
service that is essential to the current customers and to society over time constitutes one 
tool the operator has to put pressure on the government. However, that strategy opens 
up the possibility of strong retaliation by the state or the municipality and loss of 
reputation for the current operator (Zupan, 1989b). 
                                                 
18 Littlechild (2002) analyzes with great detail the PPP contract of the subway in London, which is a   
long -run contract. The contract took 3 years to be signed, cost about 15 million pounds and included 
about 2,500 pages of documentation whereas the Electricity Act, which regulated the full privatization in 
the UK, comprised 214 pages. Due to several reasons the PPP contract was broken recently.   
19 Oliver Williamson notably refers to the opportunism as the ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ 
(Williamson, 1985, p.47) 
20 According to Engel et al. (1997, p.9)  ‘the problem with renegotiations is that they replace the ex ante 
competition of competitive auctions with an ex post bilateral monopoly, in which the Government [i.e. the 
taxpayer] usually ends up worse off. Moreover, the results of renegotiation can easily lead to charges of 
corruption and discretion, which has perverse effects on the participants in future franchises’.     
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 At the same time, the government can take advantage of the fact that the operator will 
have made large infrastructure investments, which are long-lived and sunk, so that 
maximum prices can be kept close to average cost by rejecting renegotiation. If the 
operator underbid in order to be in a position to renegotiate or if there were flaws in the 
bid design, the “winner” is likely to experience serious financial strains. The 
investments made and its reputation, even with anticipated losses, can compel the 
operator to remain in the market.  
 
Thus, the awarding entity has several tools to control the opportunistic behavior of the 
private firm, including: 
• The possibility of renegotiation of the contract with the operator that, at least in 
the final stage of the contract, curbs its opportunistic behavior; 
• The existence of clauses which penalize these behaviors;  
• The decisions to be taken on the issues open for negotiation by the contract 
(which, by definition, is incomplete);  
• The impact on the operator’s reputation or that of other governmental entities;  
• The threat of early termination of the contract. 
When both parties to the contract have options for improving their positions at the 
expense of the other, disputes are likely to arise. 
 
 
3.5 PPPs and Evaluation of Regulation by Contract 
  
PPP contracts, especially those that are long term, are inevitably incomplete and are 
accompanied with large uncertainties, increasing the risks facing both parties. The 
awarding entity must devote resources to monitoring the contract (Williamson, 1976). 
Likely renegotiation of the contract, uncertainty about the future, supervision of service 
quality, and the application of sanctions transforms the role of the awarding authority 
(originally responsible for contract management) into someone with similar functions to 
a traditional (external) regulator. Regulatory functions do not disappear, whether the 
contract is short term or long term in nature.      
 
Furthermore, regulation by contract is more effective in industries that do not require 
capital intensive, long-lived investments. Such sunk investments require payments for 
the economic value of investments, complicating their transfer between those winning 
bids in two consecutive periods (see Vickers and Yarrow, 1989, p.111, Armstrong et al., 
1994, p.129 and Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p.268). Some authors even argue that PPPs 
and regulation by contract should not be used in the network sectors like water, energy 
and telecoms.21 Engel et al. (1997) add that PPPs should also not be used in sectors 
where the quality and maintenance of assets cannot be easily attested to by an external 
entity, for example where there are buried infrastructures which correspond to a 
significant portion of assets. Klein and Roger (1995) argue that regulation by contract 
should only be applied when the investments are not specific for a particular area and 
therefore they are not sunk. These academic views have not convinced policy decision-
                                                 
21 Vickers and Yarrow (1989, p.111) wrote ‘there are many industries where franchising cannot work, at 
any rate in this simple form, and in the industries described later in this book (energy, 
telecommunications, water, etc.) provide leading examples’. 
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 makers in the water sector, for example, since the introduction of the private sector is 
generally done by means of PPPs and regulation by contract. 
 
In a practical sense, unlike the ideal circumstance (e.g. when the price is the only award 
criterion, contracts are short term, and there are many capable, competitive bidders), the 
requirements of PPPs and regulation by contract are similar to those associated with 
external regulation by an autonomous agency. As such, we argue that regulation is both 
necessary and unavoidable. However, the benefits of competition for the market and 
regulation by contract can be relevant when governments seek private sector 
participation. Indeed, it is impossible to design long term contracts that are sufficiently 
complete and definitive (covering all potentially significant contingencies) and that are 
invulnerable to ex post opportunism.  
 
Thus, a possible solution utilized in many countries involves combining regulation by 
contract with external regulation, where the sector regulator is independent from the 
awarding authority (Marques and Monteiro, 2002).  In the sequencing of the award, it is 
useful to have the sector regulator responsible for providing expertise in the public 
tender stage. In addition, it should have the authority to monitor service quality, apply 
penalties for non-compliance with the contract, serve as arbiter in dispute resolution 
proceedings, and assist in mediating any contract renegotiation. This set of roles, despite 
the associated costs, combines most of the advantages of regulation by contract while 
mitigating potential problems through the monitoring activity of an external agency 
(regulator).      
 
 
 
4. THE FAILURES OF CONTRACTS  
 
4.1 Access to the Market 
 
One of the major advantages of regulation by contract and of PPPs is that in most 
situations the government uses the market prices (bids) to choose the private partner. To 
award a PPP, at least in the European Union, a public tender is compulsory and the rule 
is to choose the most economically advantageous bid. When only one criterion exists, 
normally the price (e.g. average tariff or toll), the rent paid, or the net present value, the 
winning bidder corresponds straightforwardly to the bid which presents the lowest price 
(or highest value). However, when there are several criteria, the situation is more 
complicated and it is necessary to apply multi-criteria decision analysis to choose the 
winner. In this case the awarding party should define the criteria (and eventually 
subcriteria) and the bid assessment methodology before the tender call notice.  
 
This methodology should be provided in the public tender documents and should be 
based on three major principles: (1) ensuring comparability among bidders (meeting 
some minimum organizational standards), (2) keeping the rules initially established and 
provided to the competitors before presenting their bids, and (3) evaluating only the 
essential factors, including the delineation of appropriate risk sharing (avoiding 
consideration of superficial elements). Also, when there is a two-stage bidding system, 
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 in the second stage the evaluation criteria should be the same as in the first one, and 
only the players in the short-list can improve their initial bids.22  
 
Note that previous experience and financial health of the bidders should be qualification 
criteria and not part of the bid evaluation process. Criteria which allow for discretion, 
like quality of service or safety, should be avoided. These should be pre-specified. If 
they can differ across bids, such elements are difficult to evaluate, increase the price 
associated with the bids and have a reduced value since they change over time and 
normally a PPP encompasses the long term. In addition, the authors think that in 
essential services like those provided by water and electricity utilities, the quality of 
service and the safety should be imposed, not negotiated. Of course, if bidders are likely 
to have widely different capabilities for meeting technical quality standards (and these 
are negatively correlated with other cost determinants), two quality standards might be 
set, letting the bidders make separate bids under each standard. Then the award could be 
made to the bidder with the “best” option, recognizing that such a system introduces 
some discretion into the process.   
 
Typically, PPPs establish dozens of subcriteria with substantial detail. Such elements 
are likely to be useless, and worse, damaging of the public interest by increasing the 
complexity of the evaluations and the cost of bid preparation. For the purpose of the 
bidding stage, all the variables should be standardized to increase the comparability of 
the bids. If a net present value of a bid is derived using a different discount rate from 
another bid, the values are not comparable. The same screening should be done for 
population projections, annual consumption patterns, peak demand forecasts and other 
variables. Note that this standardization is only for evaluating the bids; otherwise, the 
awarding entity would have to assume the associated renegotiation risks. For example, 
demand forecast is one of the most important determinants of cash flows (and the 
probability distributions for the forecast affect the discount rate). Of course, different 
assumptions by various bidders would have led to different bids, but when such capital 
intensive projects are under consideration, awarding the project to the most optimistic 
bidder almost guarantees renegotiation. It is better to make the award based on outputs 
(e.g. population served) or on standardized inputs (e.g. construction cost estimates for a 
pattern of demand or pre-specified physical characteristics of network expansion).  
 
Another relevant aspect is that evaluators should focus on what is important in a PPP 
contract, which is very different from traditional public procurement (e.g. public 
works). For example, since the probability of renegotiation is high, the elements that 
create valuation discrepancies should be taken into account. First, the evaluation process 
should conduct sensitivity analyses of the bid (business case) to adverse situations (e.g. 
consequences of a substantial drop in demand or in macroeconomic recession). As it 
was noted earlier, different assumptions adopted by each bidder in the business case can 
be very important. For example, two bidders may have a proposal for a similar toll in a 
highway but the shareholders of one of them demands a return on equity of 15% and the 
other requires only 10%. The financial and economic equilibrium of the business case 
will be determined by that rate, with tolls lower (or the investment recovery period 
shorter) for the latter case. So, the implications of renegotiation will be very dissimilar 
                                                 
22 The first stage sometimes corresponds to a pre-qualification stage where the technical and economic 
capabilities are evaluated.     
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 depending on the winning bid. Such contingencies must be incorporated into a PPP 
evaluation process.  
 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the tender documents are frequently badly 
prepared. If more studies and information are collected (and made available) before the 
tender call notice, all the parties benefit (Crampes and Estache, 1998). Unfortunately, 
political windows of opportunity can lead to excessively short time frames for the 
bidding process. In such cases, the cost of supporting consulting studies, inadequate 
time for preparation of bidding templates, and lack of involvement of other agencies 
with appropriate expertise lead projects to be launched with incomplete (often 
inadequate) information. For example, the public sector entity on which the project is 
based should be analyzed prior to the preparation of bidding documents, yet such 
financial and operational studies are seldom carried out in advance of tending the bid. 
The resulting lack of public information on current operator performance increases the 
risk of the project (and thus, the cost of capital) and often leads to a major assumption 
of commercial and operating risks by the public sector.       
 
 
4.2 Managing and Sharing the Risk  
 
The main theoretical benefit in PPPs is that the risks would be assigned to the 
contractual party that is best able to mitigate the risk or to bear the risk. This allocation 
minimizes the economic costs associated with such risks. From this perspective, the 
State should not transfer the risks that are under its control to the private partner; nor 
should it (as it represents taxpayers) assume the risks that are out of its control. In the 
European Union (Eurostat), the rule is not to include the PPP’s charges in the public 
accounts if the private sector has to support at least two of the three risks: construction 
risk and demand risk or availability risk. Most contracts have clauses protecting the 
private sector from bearing such risks while ensuring economic and financial 
equilibrium during the contract. If it is clear that exogenous events would lead to the 
contract re-negotiation, such events (and related to risks) should have been assigned to 
appropriate parties and carefully defined ex-ante.  
 
The allocation of risks and the contractual clauses affecting the economic and financial 
equilibrium are required to avoid opportunistic behavior and to provide the value for 
money of the project.  Figure 1 indicates how the evaluation of risks in a PPP involve a 
number of steps: (1) identification of risks, (2) classification of risks, (3) evaluation of 
their probability, (4) evaluation of their impact, and (5) identification of measures for 
minimizing risk (Marques and Berg, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 1 – Steps in Risk Evaluation 
 
Since risk is defined as the probability of a particular event occurring, all the steps 
should be considered before a PPP is launched. They are particularly important to 
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 determine if the PPP model is the most appropriate, in terms of the alternative: a public 
sector comparator.23 In evaluating the PPP, the private firm should take risks based on 
well-designed incentives: to promote cost containment and to manage risks. Thus, it is 
crucial that those preparing the contract identify and allocate risks before the public 
tender stage. The authors suggest that a risk matrix with contractual clauses addressing 
each risk should be developed before opening bidding and provided to the bidders. The 
bidding documents should limit ex ante situations that may lead to ex post opportunism.  
 
Risks can be divided into production, commercial and contextual risks. Some of these 
risks are associated with the bidding process stage and others with the project stage 
(Marques and Berg, 2009). While risks related to the production process are almost 
always best borne by the private sector, the commercial and contextual ones are mixed; 
unfortunately, sometimes they are transferred to the private sector. Figure 2 presents the 
most typical risks and classifies them according to the information above. The 
importance of each risk depends on the infrastructure services at stake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production risks
Planning +++
Conception ++++
Expropriation +
Construction ++++
Environmental +
Maintenance and major 
repairs
+++
Operation +++
Technological ++
Performance +++
Commercial risks
Demand +++++
Collection +
Capacity +++
Competition +
Context risks
Financing ++++
Inflation ++
Legal ++
Regulation +++
Unilateral changes +++++
Public contestation ++
Force majeure ++
+ Low risk     +++++ High risk
Figure 2 – Identification of Major Risks  
 
Demand developments and unilateral changes generally have the most serious 
consequences for the continuation of a mutually beneficial partnership. Concerning the 
demand risk, often the public authority is influenced by an optimistic bias, since this 
allows to increase its rent in the short-term. It assumes high growth rates (unrelated to 
reality), justifying an unrealistically high up-front PPP payment.24 This risk can be 
eliminated if the contract length is variable, dependent on the observed demand and/or 
                                                 
23 The public sector comparator is a benchmark value which represents the most efficient procurement 
cost to achieve the required service delivery outcomes and it is used as the baseline (sometimes as a 
maximum price) for assessing the potential value for money of the project. The document justifying the 
computation of this benchmark is compulsory in several countries and in the opinion of the authors 
should be provided to the bidders.  For more about the public sector comparator, see Quiggin (2004). 
24 The up-front payment has an important benefit in the perspective of public sector, since it is seldom 
renegotiated (Crampes and Estache, 1998).  
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 of the corresponding revenue (Engel et al., 2001).25 The common practice is to assume 
that a change of demand over 10 to 20 per cent leads to a renegotiation of the economic 
and financial equilibrium. In such situations, demand risk is nearly completely borne by 
the public sector (generally passed on to the users or customers). As far as unilateral 
changes (political) risk is concerned, the solutions are more difficult but the contract 
clauses should be sufficiently deterring to avoid regime changes, mitigating them by 
assigning associated risks (again) to the public partner.   
 
 
4.3 Monitoring Contracts 
      
Monitoring the contract is equivalent (in practical terms) to the role performed by an 
external regulator. Indeed, the entity managing the contract has functions quite similar 
to those of a regulator. Maybe the greatest difference is that the “contract 
manager/monitor” has less discretion than a sector regulator, since some of the terms 
and conditions are fully specified in the contract. The major problems of monitoring are 
related to supervising service quality, resolving contractual disputes, applying sanctions 
and performance rewards, potential renegotiation and alterations of the business case 
(investments), early termination of the contract, asset transfer, and renewal of the PPP. 
Specific procedures for reporting by the PPP-holder (and the associated information 
quantity and quality) is important as well. Such issues should be determined prior to the 
contract signature and (as far as possible) included in the tender documents. Similarly, 
at this stage the resources required to perform contract monitoring should be predicted.   
 
Quality of service supervision is a core issue for most infrastructure contracts. The 
levels of service can be embedded into the contract but they can change over time, 
making it necessary to monitor relevant indicators. The invisible deterioration of the 
infrastructures is also hard to establish. Normally, performance indicators associated 
with levels of service are used for this purpose; data are used for comparisons. The 
resulting public discussion (a name and shame policy) can press the operators to 
improve their service quality over time. Such public disclosure of results on a regular 
basis is unlikely to occur under self-regulation: a data collection/reporting organization 
is necessary for this purpose. The role of this body is comparable to that of regulator.    
 
The application of sanctions and dispute resolution processes are other important issues. 
Regarding the former, sanctions (or penalties) should be automatically applied after due 
diligence. In several countries, owing to the ineffective judicial system, the sanctions 
are never applied as since private operators avoid them though appeals. However, 
sanctions can put pressure on suppliers to improve performance (e.g. reducing 
electricity shortages or water service interruptions). If there is payment by the public 
partner to the private firm, the sanction can be applied directly; the same applies when 
the operator receives a rent from the private firm. The performance rewards can also be 
automatically defined in this way. Sanctions represent a tool for putting pressure on the 
operator. The contract is not necessarily working well if no sanctions are applied. 
                                                 
25 These authors suggest that the award criteria should be the ‘least present value of revenue’ (Engel et 
al., 2001). Indeed, where the demand (consumption) risk is relevant, this option has great benefits. 
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 Finally, an independent body can play an important role by becoming a referee in 
conflict resolution processes.26      
 
The renegotiation stage has already been discussed. A PPP contract is considered a 
failure if renegotiation occurs during its period of operation. Therefore, from the start, it 
is fundamental that both partners must be responsible for bearing and mitigating their 
respective risks. When the contract breaks down, resources must be spent by both 
partners, first before restoration of financial and economic equilibrium and after in the 
revision of the contract. One approach might be to formally incorporate renegotiation of 
the contract, for example, from 10 to 10 years or from 5 to 5 years. However, the 
conditions related to the internal rate of return (of project and of equity) and other 
financial indicators should be those initially established in the competitive and for that 
reason their evaluation at the tender stage is of major importance. Moreover, only the 
event or cause that precipitated the renegotiation should be incorporated into the new 
business case. Under no circumstance is it acceptable for the private sector to take 
advantage of renegotiation (for a particular event) and use the process to recover the 
losses related to risks assumed by the private partner. On the other hand, if there is a 
change in the investment plan required by changes in the law (as with some new 
environmental regulation), a separate body (external regulator) should evaluate the 
impact of the exogenous change on the firm.  
 
Two other issues are the criteria for calculating associated compensation and the 
procedure for early termination of the contract. The appropriate compensation depends 
on whether the origin of the breakdown is a unilateral decision of the awarding 
authority or is in fact due to activities or decisions of the private firm. Procedures for 
addressing responsibility can be set in the contract but they are often not well-specified. 
Another omission is the right to receive the value of non-depreciated investments and 
compensation for lost profits (or damage caused) if the one responsible is the public 
partner. Such situations need to be addressed by an independent third entity. 
 
Finally, the transfer of assets and their renewal are also controversial. The determination 
of the asset value is neither easy nor peaceful when the amount is in dispute between the 
public and private partners. As a result, the incumbent often continues to be the one 
responsible for the infrastructure service. In Europe there are private monopolies in 
place for longer than 100 years precisely for this reason (e.g. Águas de Valencia in 
Spain).  
 
 
5. MODELS OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION 
 
As mentioned above, models of privatization can be classified into two major groups: 
contractual PPPs and institutionalized PPPs. The first one is purely contractual and 
includes concession, affermage (leasing) and management contracts. Contractual PPPs 
like BOOT or BOT models are normally included in the public works concession 
contracts. When the infrastructure is owned by the private sector, the public sector 
                                                 
26 Independence is also important when the regulator is responsible for amending contracts ex post.  
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 seems to engage in less intervention. For example, such a framework is usually adopted 
for the construction of bridges.27 Table 1 presents key features of four arrangements.  
 
 Table 1 – Features of the Purely Contractual PPP 
Feature Management contract Affermage Concession Full divesture 
Ownership  Public Public Public Private 
Assets ownership  Public  Public Public/private Private 
Investment Public  Public Private Private 
Commercial risk Public Shared Mainly private Private 
Payment Government  Users Users Users 
Duration 3 to 8 years 8 to 15 years 20 to 35 years - 
 
Of course, concessions can have complications, as when determining whether the 
project is bankable. Investor perceptions of these commercial and operating risks affect 
the cost of capital. Nevertheless, concession contractual PPPs have benefits to the extent 
that equity can be leveraged and that private participation improves incentives for high 
performance. Such arrangements are primarily adopted when large investments are 
necessary or the governments are maximizing up-front payments (rent-seeking by the 
principal). They are used in several sectors, particularly in the water sector and in 
transportation (e.g. highways and seaports).  
 
Affermage contracts have other kind of risks. As the private firm is not responsible for 
new investment, its performance can be negatively affected if there is public sector 
underinvestment. The outcome might be low marks based on benchmarking indicators, 
yet the public asset owner is responsible for reported “poor” operating performance.  
Thus, issues of mutual accountability arise. This affermage model is employed in two 
different situations. This option can be utilized if the Government does not want to raise 
prices and commits to continuing public investments. Thus, private firms do not need to 
raise capital at market rates. This division of responsibilities amounts to a subsidy to 
customers provided by the public partner. The model reduces both the risk and potential 
return of the private partner. In the second situation, the amount of investment is 
reduced and the government intends to periodically rebid the contract. The latter is 
frequently prone to risk, when the government cannot fulfill investment deadlines, 
causing delays in infrastructure construction. The result is lower cash flows than 
predicted, increasing the likelihood of reduced quality in the short-run (with cutbacks in 
staffing) and the long-run (due to reductions in maintenance outlays).28 Furthermore, 
customers deal with the operator and not with the one who is responsible for 
investments, complicating public perceptions regarding which partner is ‘blamed’ for 
weak performance. These contracts are very popular in the water sector in France.  
 
                                                 
27 In several countries, the constitution prohibits private ownership of transportation and other essential 
infrastructures; therefore, BOOT projects cannot be implemented. 
28 Governments have a natural tendency towards an ‘escalation of commitment’ which can actually harm 
the public interest (Dietz-Uhler, 1996). Examples from Japan, US, UK, India, Latin America, and Africa 
are presented in Berg et al. (2002).   
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 In management contracts, there is no direct relationship between the private partner and 
the customers. The private partner is paid by the government for performing particular 
tasks. Normally, management contracts are implemented in sectors such as health or 
education (which are heavily subsidized by taxpayers) or in the management of water 
and wastewater treatment plants (where revenues are unlikely to cover costs). A priori, 
these contracts should have a short length, but sometimes such contracts are in effect for 
extended periods. For example, hospital contracts in some countries can be 30 years in 
duration.29 
 
The second model of partnership is the institutionalized PPP. Here the public sector and 
a private company create a third company to perform an infrastructure service or an 
existing public company sells part of its shares to the private sector. The public sector, 
in general, holds the corporate control of the company although the technical 
management is normally carried out by the private company. Curiously, this model has 
been little analyzed in the literature although it is very popular in some countries (e.g. 
the Société d’economie mixte in France, the Stadtwerke in Germany or the Empresa 
Mixte in Spain).30 The few studies have diverging critiques of such arrangements. At a 
first glance, the model has sound principles, since sharing management responsibility 
can avoid some conflicts (Marra, 2007). Since the public sector is now more 
accountable, there is less imperfect information and the disputes can be solved 
internally: outcomes can improve. Participants from the public sector, primarily local 
public sector agents, also like the model. They hold their authority (and political power) 
over infrastructure services by being able to appoint the board of directors, approve 
major decisions, and interfere with daily management.  
 
However, companies that are jointly owned by private shareholders and government can 
lead to the worst of both worlds, achieving neither high profitability nor worthwhile 
social goals (Boardman and Vining, 2008). The problems revolve around political, 
contextual, and incentive issues. Governments in power at any level seldom 
acknowledge or criticize their own earlier decisions. Thus, risks tend to be passed on to 
customers via higher rates (or taxpayers through implicit subsidies). In the contractual 
PPP, an arms-length relationship is established through a signed contract setting out (1) 
the rights and duties of the parties and (2) the financial conditions of the service, and (3) 
the duration of the arrangement. In institutionalized PPPs, there are only the statutes of 
the firm and a shareholder agreement document which regulates the relationships 
between the private and public partners. As the public sector is involved in 
management, key elements like price levels and price structures, quality of service, and 
investments are periodically defined. This period is initially relatively long; despite 
having an initial public tender for the sale of shares, it is easy for the private partner to 
justify cost overruns to its public peer, leading to a need for tariff changes. For this 
reason, the incentives to be efficient and innovative are reduced. Another problem is 
                                                 
29 Often such contracts only include overseeing construction of the building and its maintenance. Such an 
approach, although adopted from the perspective of the whole life cycle of the infrastructure project, 
mainly aims at having fewer installment payments. This can be costly for the financing of a project as 
private financing is more expensive than public financing, given investor attitudes towards risk and the 
ability of the government to diversify across the economy and internalize some external benefits.  
30 Some exceptions are provided in Eckel and Vining (1985), Vining and Boardman (1989), Chui (2003), 
Marra (2007) and Bognetti and Robotti (2007). 
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 that frequently there are generous payments by the mixed company to the private firm 
for management fees; in addition, there may be payments to the mixed company or the 
private firm for other services provided directly to the municipality.31          
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper evaluates regulatory contracts in PPPs for infrastructure industries. After 
providing an overview of the theoretical merits and shortcomings of PPPs, the paper 
examined actual practice for contractual PPPs and institutionalized PPPs (mixed 
companies). The ideas behind PPPs are sound: the spread of this public procurement 
model is justified in principle. However, PPPs (as implemented) often have problems 
related to the design and incompleteness of contracts which, as rule, start when the 
public tender documents are developed and distributed. The effectiveness of contracts 
depends on a number of characteristics, including conditions affecting their likely 
extension, the balance between short term contract rebidding and incompleteness 
associated with longer term contracts, and how effectively the contract constrains 
opportunism ex post.  Despite well-documented problems, both contractual and mixed 
company PPPs are widely utilized in the delivery of infrastructure services. The major 
explanation for this is associated with financing, which unfortunately is a politically 
powerful driver, even if the economic consequences can be problematic in the long 
term. Here, regulatory contracts are analyzed in terms of access to the market, 
approaches to risk sharing, and contract monitoring. Failures in any of these areas can 
result in a PPP not meeting citizen expectations. We present several recommendations 
and underscore the need for better preparation of PPP public tenders, both in terms of 
preliminary studies and the design of the bidding documents. Outcomes can be 
improved by giving greater attention to risk allocation, reducing the role of discretion 
when formalizing award criteria, and establishing credible procedures for monitoring 
performance.   
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